Aristotle and Aquinas

With so much comparison between the ancient Greeks and the Christian tradition going on in this class, I decided to share a few quick thoughts on Aristotle and Aquinas. It is clear that both hold virtue to be highly important and necessary to reach a higher ultimate end. Aquinas accepts this idea of habituation and teaching as methods of instilling virtue, but adds another major component to the mix. Not only are there acquired virtues that each person can develop on their own (Aristotle), but there are also infused virtues that are only obtained through God. God is the biggest difference between Aristotle and Aquinas, because having God as the center of one's life changes every other aspect of living a proper moral life.

This influences the comparison of the ultimate end for both philosophers. They do agree about happiness playing a central role in one's pursuit of actions. Happiness rooted in contemplation for Aristotle is tied to the divine, but also occurs in this life. Aquinas on the other hand, makes beatitude (intellectual vision of God) the ultimate end with happiness being a necessary consequence of this end. Additionally, Aquinas and Aristotle agree that reason is a major source from which knowledge, virtues, and proper morality flow forth. However, the influence of a belief in God is again the difference maker with Aquinas also arguing that faith is an equal player in achieving knowledge, virtue, and proper morality.

These are only a couple quick thoughts that immediately come to mind when talking about these two and there is so much more to talk about. Much of what Aristotle lacks comes as a consequence of the time period that he lived in. Had he lived after the coming of Christ and had that knowledge by revelation, I think we would have seen an even more agreeable picture painted with his works.

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Traits of Contemplation

Aristotle argues that a life of contemplation is a virtuous activity that contains the final end of happiness. Contemplation is not only the highest activity, but it is the most continuous, because one can study and enjoy what they know more easily than any other activity. This activity uses the highest self which is the intellect, and activities that conform to virtues along with theoretical wisdom are the most pleasant. For the virtuous man will find what is most pleasant to him to be in conformity with virtue. 

Contemplation is also self-sufficient in that one can study by himself and is not dependent on any external goods. Although one can greatly benefit from having others around him to contemplate with, this activity is possible to do alone and does not absolutely need others. Even though sufficient nourishment of the body is required to contemplate, this can be said for all virtuous activity and thus ignored.

Contemplation is also performed for its own sake and not as a means to something else. Here Aristotle is talking about contemplation in terms of enjoying what one already knows and not in terms of studying at school as a means to get a job or a degree. Finally, contemplation is done as leisure and contains the highest amount of freedom from fatigue. One works so that he may have time for leisure. For all of these reasons, Aristotle believes that contemplation is the virtuous activity that holds the final end which is happiness.

-BaylorBear16

1000 Word Draft

An Aristotelian Guide to Moral Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics

            Throughout books 1-4 of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle establishes a system of activity by which all men can acquire moral virtue in this life. Attaining moral virtue is important, because Aristotle believes it helps the individual attain happiness which is the end that which all good men aim at. Much of what we do as individuals stems from a pursuit of happiness. Since virtue is tied to happiness, understanding how to acquire moral virtue will make it easier for the individual to achieve a happy life. Even if we do not agree with everything Aristotle has to offer, at the very least, he can help us better understand virtue which benefits not only ourselves, but other people around us. I will argue that Aristotle believes moral virtue is achieved through habitual activity of the appetitive part of the soul as influenced by reason in pursuit of a mean between excess and deficiency. First, I will explain the different parts of the human soul which will allow for a better understanding of the two major types of virtue Aristotle addresses. Next, I will discuss Aristotle’s system of the mean as well as the necessary conditions required for virtuous activity. Finally, I will present several examples of Aristotle’s virtues as understood through pursuing a mean. By replicating this same activity in our own lives, we can obtain moral virtue for ourselves and take the next step towards happiness as part of the good.

            In order to understand moral virtue, one first needs to know the different parts of the human soul. This is because virtue is the excellence of one’s soul and happiness is an activity of the soul, not the body (NE 1102a.15). Aristotle divides the soul into two parts the irrational and rational parts of the soul. The irrational part lacks reason, but in some instances can interact with it. The rational part of the soul is where one finds the use and source of reason to be the primary function. These two sides of the soul are then further categorized into smaller parts. The irrational part is subdivided into a vegetative and appetitive part of the soul. This vegetative or nutritive part is common among all living things including plants, animals, and humans. It is responsible for the growth or nurturing aspect of the individual, thus any organism that is partaking in nourishment must contain a vegetative part of the soul (NE 1102b). Interestingly this description means that a vegetative part of the soul does not just apply to growing plants or born humans, but to seedlings and embryos. Thus, even an unborn child going through embryonic development would have at the very least a vegetative soul. However, this nutritive part is not associated with virtue or human excellence because it is common to all organisms and generally involuntary (NE 1102b.10). Activity of this part is seen in involuntary things such as digestion, growing taller, or having to sleep. Everything is oriented towards the goal of maintaining the individual’s life at the most basic level.

            The appetitive or perceptual part of the soul is the second part of the irrational side, but does contain a certain interaction with reason. Aristotle explains that the appetitive part in good men can follow the leadership of reason, but in bad men opposes and rebels against reason (NE 1102b.20). This rebellion is why the appetitive part of the soul falls under the irrational side despite its positive interactions with reason as well. This part deals with the appetites or desires of individuals for example sex or food. It also deals with perceptual sensations such as touch or smell and, in this way, can be found in higher animals as well (Shields). Additionally, different emotions such as pleasure and anger stem from this part of the soul. This appetitive part is where the struggle for moral virtue can be found.

            The rational side gives rise to the intellectual part of the soul. This is what makes humans unique to all other living things. The intellect is not found within animals or plants and produces reason which governs the mind. For Aristotle, this intellectual capacity is essential to all humans and is what makes humans human (Shields). This intellectual capacity attempts to control our desires and emotions keeping them aligned towards the good. The activity of this part of the soul consists in understanding and contemplation. Aristotle makes another distinction separating the intellectual capacity into the theoretical intellect and the practical intellect (Shields). The theoretical intellect deals with scientific knowledge and understanding things in themselves. It deals with those things which are the highest by nature (NE 1141b). The practical intellect focuses on what is good for man and the ability to discern the things in life which are aimed at man’s proper end (NE 1142b). It can help man recognize what action to take that is good for the individual in each case with regards to the right end. It is no surprise then that intellectual virtues stem from this part of the soul.

            With the different parts of the soul distinguished, we can gain a sense of what things the two major types of virtue that I have already mentioned address. Moral virtue focuses on how to control man’s appetites, emotions, and desires with reason. Some examples of moral virtues include courage, justice, temperance, and generosity. All of these moral virtues are connected in some way to things that humans want or feel. Intellectual virtue deals with different types of knowledge and deliberating the good. Some examples include techne, scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, and theoretical wisdom. Both types of virtue deal with a separate part of the soul, but both require the use of reason to acquire and develop them. This is why only humans can attain such virtues, because they have a rational capacity.

Works Cited

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Martin Ostwald. 1st ed. New York: Macmillan, 1962. Print.

Shields, Christopher. "Aristotle's Psychology." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. Stanford University, Spring 2016. Web. 12 Apr. 2016. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/aristotle-psychology/>.

Unequal Friendship

Aristotle seems to give a somewhat unsure response to the possibility of friendships that are between unequal individuals. When talking about those that are highly virtuous being friends with those that are not really virtuous at all, he uses the example of a king to a peasant (1159a). This relationship is highly unlikely and would not be something that anybody would expect. However, Aristotle also says that the point at which inequality rules out friendship is unclear. Only in terms of divinity and man does he think it clear that friendship seems impossible due to their separation.

Later in chapter 14 of book VIII, Aristotle gives an explanation of what both sides of the unequal friendship are to give each other if it is of the virtuous nature. It is obvious that the person of lower standing benefits from becoming friends with a highly virtuous person because they can learn how to be more virtuous and can be educated on the subject. This would only be a utility friendship, so what does the greater person benefit from the lower? The lower person is to give the more virtuous person honor for their excellence and teachings. Aristotle believes honor to be a proportionate benefit to what the higher individual gives the lesser. By maintaining this proportionality, equality within the friendship is restored. Thus, it seems that unequal individuals can become friends. Does the limitation of friendship between divinity and man oppose Christian thought?

-BaylorBear16

Wishing Well for a Friend

At the end of chapter 7 book VIII, Aristotle talks about wishing the good of a friend within complete friendship. It is obvious that we should wish for the other's well-being for the sake of the other. However, what about wishing the greatest good for the other regardless of the self? Aristotle believes that we should not wish the greatest good for another (becoming a god) because then that would remove the person from our friendship. We would no longer have them as a friend and would not be able to virtuously benefit each other. Thus, we should not wish for all of the greatest goods upon another, because we wish for our own good most of all. Aristotle suggests that complete friendship is wishing the greatest good of becoming a god upon another only if you are also to receive the same good.

I disagree with this particular aspect of Aristotle's friendship, because it seems to go against the Christian notion of charity for our fellow human brothers and sisters. In the Christian tradition, wishing that another person go to heaven is similar to Aristotle's good of becoming a god. However, we are called to wish for another's reaching of heaven regardless of our own particular circumstance through charity. By loving our neighbor as we would want to be loved, we should want everyone to reach heaven independent of the self. This is drastically different from Aristotle's perspective which is more self-oriented in the sense of gaining goods for yourself first. The only other explanation for this text is that Aristotle is talking more about human nature within friendship instead of this being complete friendship, but I do not see it as such.

-BaylorBear16

Hierarchy of Friendship

Aristotle poses three different kinds of friendship in Book VIII: utility, pleasure, and perfect friendship. Friendship based on utility is seen among individuals who would gain some worldly usefulness from befriending each other. Pleasure friendships are similar to those of utility because the individuals are useful to each other, but in the form of pleasure or pleasantness. Perfect or complete friendship is between two good virtuous men and is the highest form of friendship. This is achieved when both wish for the well-being of the other for the other's sake. There is an active participation in furthering that individual's flourishing. In participating in a perfect friendship there is also the existence of utility and pleasure friendships within it, but these are not the primary source of the friendship.

This leads to the question of whether complete perfect friendship rises out of utility or pleasure friendships? It is evident that the majority of friendships that an individual has are based on utility and pleasure as Aristotle says that perfect friendship is rare. Due to the time and effort required to attain perfect friendship, it seems that one could only have a few of these friendships. It makes sense that friendships could start as utility and pleasure, but over time turn into complete friendship after getting to know the other. However, I do not think that this hierarchy is to be followed so strictly. It also seems that the closer two individuals get to being virtuous, the friendships they form at that moment are going to be virtuous from the start or else they would not be virtuous people. Thus perfect friendships might start as utility or pleasure, but they can also come about on their own.

-BaylorBear16

Necessary Conditions for Virtue

Although Aristotle explains how to attain the mean and what it consists in, he also gives other conditions that must be met for some action to be considered virtuous. Moral virtue is concerned with both passivity and activity. The passive aspect deals with the emotion and the activity deals with an action of virtue. Both are connected together to establish moral virtue. The action must be done to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, for the right reason, and in the right way (1109a.25). These five conditions make it much harder to perform virtuous activity and force the agent to really intend such an act for it to be valid. In some ways this makes sense, because Aristotle believes habituation can develop moral virtue, but that only seems possible if the person is consciously engaged toward this virtue. These five conditions solidify that mentality and contribute to the formation of a disposition or state of mind, rather than something we do every once in a while.

One issue with this is that Aristotle does not make clear who determines the rightness of these different conditions. Must these conditions be objectively right to any person, or must these conditions be right with respect to the individual. One example is generosity where the individual is to give just the right amount of money without being too stingy or too extravagant. Say the individual meets all the conditions except giving it to the right person. They give it to someone posing to be poor rather than an actual poor person. The individual thinks they gave it to the right person and would meet all of the conditions. Such an act would seem to shape the individual toward the mean of generosity. However, objectively they did not give it to the right person which would not be virtuous. Depending on the perspective, the conditions were either met or not. I think many would say that such an act would move the individual toward the mean since they did not know the person was posing as poor even if it may not have been completely virtuous. I have trouble deciding myself, but regardless of the stance, this example shows that the lines of virtuous activity can easily become blurred. What would Aristotle think of this example?

-BaylorBear16