An Aristotelian Guide to Moral Virtue in
the Nicomachean Ethics
Throughout books 1-4
of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle
establishes a system of activity by which all men can acquire moral virtue in
this life. Attaining moral virtue is important, because Aristotle believes it
helps the individual attain happiness which is the end that which all good men
aim at. Much of what we do as individuals stems from a pursuit of happiness.
Since virtue is tied to happiness, understanding how to acquire moral virtue
will make it easier for the individual to achieve a happy life. Even if we do
not agree with everything Aristotle has to offer, at the very least, he can
help us better understand virtue which benefits not only ourselves, but other
people around us. I will argue that Aristotle believes moral virtue is achieved
through habitual activity of the appetitive part of the soul as influenced by
reason in pursuit of a mean between excess and deficiency. First, I will
explain the different parts of the human soul which will allow for a better
understanding of the two major types of virtue Aristotle addresses. Next, I
will discuss Aristotle’s system of the mean as well as the necessary conditions
required for virtuous activity. Finally, I will present several examples of
Aristotle’s virtues as understood through pursuing a mean. By replicating this
same activity in our own lives, we can obtain moral virtue for ourselves and
take the next step towards happiness as part of the good.
In order to understand
moral virtue, one first needs to know the different parts of the human soul. This
is because virtue is the excellence of one’s soul and happiness is an activity
of the soul, not the body (NE 1102a.15). Aristotle divides the soul into two
parts the irrational and rational parts of the soul. The irrational part lacks
reason, but in some instances can interact with it. The rational part of the
soul is where one finds the use and source of reason to be the primary function.
These two sides of the soul are then further categorized into smaller parts.
The irrational part is subdivided into a vegetative and appetitive part of the
soul. This vegetative or nutritive part is common among all living things
including plants, animals, and humans. It is responsible for the growth or
nurturing aspect of the individual, thus any organism that is partaking in
nourishment must contain a vegetative part of the soul (NE 1102b). Interestingly
this description means that a vegetative part of the soul does not just apply
to growing plants or born humans, but to seedlings and embryos. Thus, even an
unborn child going through embryonic development would have at the very least a
vegetative soul. However, this nutritive part is not associated with virtue or
human excellence because it is common to all organisms and generally involuntary
(NE 1102b.10). Activity of this part is seen in involuntary things such as
digestion, growing taller, or having to sleep. Everything is oriented towards
the goal of maintaining the individual’s life at the most basic level.
The appetitive or
perceptual part of the soul is the second part of the irrational side, but does
contain a certain interaction with reason. Aristotle explains that the
appetitive part in good men can follow the leadership of reason, but in bad men
opposes and rebels against reason (NE 1102b.20). This rebellion is why the
appetitive part of the soul falls under the irrational side despite its
positive interactions with reason as well. This part deals with the appetites
or desires of individuals for example sex or food. It also deals with
perceptual sensations such as touch or smell and, in this way, can be found in
higher animals as well (Shields). Additionally, different emotions such as
pleasure and anger stem from this part of the soul. This appetitive part is
where the struggle for moral virtue can be found.
The rational side gives
rise to the intellectual part of the soul. This is what makes humans unique to
all other living things. The intellect is not found within animals or plants
and produces reason which governs the mind. For Aristotle, this intellectual
capacity is essential to all humans and is what makes humans human (Shields). This
intellectual capacity attempts to control our desires and emotions keeping them
aligned towards the good. The activity of this part of the soul consists in understanding
and contemplation. Aristotle makes another distinction separating the intellectual
capacity into the theoretical intellect and the practical intellect (Shields). The
theoretical intellect deals with scientific knowledge and understanding things
in themselves. It deals with those things which are the highest by nature (NE
1141b). The practical intellect focuses on what is good for man and the ability
to discern the things in life which are aimed at man’s proper end (NE 1142b). It
can help man recognize what action to take that is good for the individual in
each case with regards to the right end. It is no surprise then that intellectual
virtues stem from this part of the soul.
With the different parts
of the soul distinguished, we can gain a sense of what things the two major
types of virtue that I have already mentioned address. Moral virtue focuses on
how to control man’s appetites, emotions, and desires with reason. Some examples
of moral virtues include courage, justice, temperance, and generosity. All of
these moral virtues are connected in some way to things that humans want or
feel. Intellectual virtue deals with different types of knowledge and
deliberating the good. Some examples include techne, scientific knowledge,
practical wisdom, and theoretical wisdom. Both types of virtue deal with a separate
part of the soul, but both require the use of reason to acquire and develop
them. This is why only humans can attain such virtues, because they have a
rational capacity.
Works Cited
Aristotle.
Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Martin Ostwald.
1st ed. New York: Macmillan, 1962. Print.
Shields,
Christopher. "Aristotle's Psychology." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta.
Stanford University, Spring 2016. Web. 12 Apr. 2016.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/aristotle-psychology/>.
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